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1. Introduction
Privatisation has certainly been an overriding force in financial markets development.
According to recent accounts, in the last 15 years privatisation substantially contributed
to the total capitalisation of world’s stock markets. As of end 1998 the total market value
of privatised companies was nearly 10 per cent of the world’s total, boasting over one-
fifth of the non-US total (Megginson and Boutchkova, 1999).
In the last ten years, the massive wave of privatisations by international offerings
fostered the development of global capital markets and the scope of cross-border
investment (Asher, 1996). To date, the 21 largest common stock issues in history have
been privatisations, and 15 of which global offerings. Furthermore, among the 650 major
sales of the last ten years, about 150 involved an equity issue on non-domestic markets,
yielding approximately US$52bn Government revenue (data from Privatisation
International).
Domestic financial market development is often an explicit objective of
privatisation programs. In this respect, the decision to list the company in international
markets appears puzzling since a fraction of equity will be allocated to foreign investors
and traded abroad; however, privatised companies appear to be particularly eager to seek
a foreign listing (Pagano et al., 1999).
This paper tackles this apparent puzzle, trying to answer the following questions.
Why do Governments list abroad or cross-list privatised companies? Which factors could
explain their willingness to sell equity on foreign markets? What are the economic,
political or institutional issues at stake?
We provide some answers by examining 392 share issue privatisations in 42
countries
1. First of all, we distinguish issues involving a foreign tranche – earmarked to
non-domestic markets and investors – and purely domestic privatisations. This allows us
to estimate the factors underlying (i) the probability of listing abroad at the privatisation
stage; (ii) the percentage of privatised stock floated abroad.
The main results that we have obtained can be summarised as follows.
                                                
1 We are painfully aware of the limitations of cross country analyses like the present one and of the risks
one runs in such a comparative study. We hope that the benefits will prove larger than the undeniable costs.4
The analysis of the whole sample shows that cross-listing is a global trend,
becoming more important over time as the Government acquires experience and financial
markets integration advances.
The sector where the firm operates is also relevant. We find strong evidence that
companies exposed to global competition are more eager to seek a foreign listing,
submitting to the discipline of international capital markets. This is particularly true for
telecommunications companies, which seem to have an in-built vocation towards foreign
exchanges. On the contrary, Governments show much more reluctance to sell abroad
shares of companies operating in the energy sector. Probably Governments are cautious
when privatising “strategic” sectors and foreign investors wary of political interference.
Another aspects that emerges from our analysis is that Governments resort to
international sales as a way to promote trade. A low level of inward and outward trade
flows is systematically associated with a higher probability of cross-listing and with
higher stakes sold to foreign investors. Tapping international financial markets is
therefore considered functional to increase the penetration on foreign product markets.
The international profile of share issue privatisations has a political determinant:
“right-wing” Governments are less likely to sell abroad and tend to sell a larger
percentage of shares to domestic investors. The empirical predictions of the political
economy of privatisation is confirmed in our data (Biais and Perotti, 1999): right-wing
Governments earmark shares to domestic investors to increase the spread of ownership
and to create the political support for market oriented policies.
The analysis of the global sample indicates that there might be considerable
differences in two sub-samples of countries (OECD vs. non-OECD countries), and this
second part of the analysis also yields interesting results. In particular, two aspects
emerge. First, the global analysis contains results which are the due to one or the other
group of countries, but often conceals effects of opposite signs. Moreover, some
differences emerge between the decisions (i) to sell privatised companies abroad and (ii)
how much equity to float. The results of this finer analysis are the following.
First of all, stock market liquidity favours cross-listing in advanced economies,
while in “emerging” markets lower liquidity is what induces Governments to engage in
the operation. The intuition seems to be that the location of the market where most of
trading will take place is crucial. Within OECD countries, selling abroad does not change
the fact that home-country bias in investors’ decisions will make the home exchange the
dominant one; the more liquid it is, the more likely investors are to welcome the5
privatised firm. In emerging or developing economies, the foreign market is often the
dominant one, so that home market features are no obstacle to the cross-listing; in this
case, the crucial factor is the desire of the Government to list its company in a more
liquid market, and this is more important for countries with weak home stock markets.
Second, different legal institutions play different roles in the two sub-samples.
Shareholder protection matters in OECD countries: a Government of a developed
country affording weak shareholder protection cross-list more, in order to import foreign
best practices and to borrow the reputation of more established exchanges. On the
contrary,  creditor protection matters in non-OECD countries. In less developed
economies, a weak legal protection to creditors probably reduces the scope of bank
finance, forcing Governments to look for external finance abroad.
Coming to political theories of privatisation, we can see that the general statement
that right-wing Governments sell smaller shares of the company abroad is confirmed in
all analyses. However, the non-OECD sample indicates that “right-wing” Governments
in these economies are more likely to sell abroad; indeed, selling a firm to foreign
investors could represent a commitment device supporting market oriented policies.
Finally, new determinants emerge in the analysis of sub-samples. In OECD
countries unemployment is crucial: we find high rates of unemployment associated with
a lower frequency of international sales, indicating that Government are probably fearful
of the pressures to cut employment coming from foreign investors. Second, Governments
in financial distress sell a large fraction of privatised equity abroad in order to maximise
proceeds. Indeed, floating the company on more developed stock market should allow
Governments to generate more revenue.
In non-OECD economies, a low level of foreign debt is key to target successfully
foreign markets. Countries in financial distress are less able to float companies abroad;
public finance variables seem to play the role of indicators of financial credibility for the
country, and investors are reluctant to invest where country risk is too high.
The paper is thus mainly related to two streams of literature. The first one deals
with privatisation methods – which however only seldom tackles the issue of where to
sell a firm – and the second one focuses on the cross-listing by private firms.
Within the empirical literature on privatisation (see Megginson and Netter (1999)
for a survey), several papers analysed the choice of the privatisation method. Megginson
et al. study the choice by Governments of sale in the form of a private placement vs.
floatation on public equity markets, finding that share offerings are more frequent the6
larger is the firm, when the company is a telecom, and the more developed are capital
markets. Private sales are instead more likely when government’ deficit is high.
Bortolotti et al. (1999) confirm the importance of budget constraints in Governments’
opting for direct sales, finding also a political determinant in the choice of the
privatisation method: right-wing governments are associated with privatisation on public
equity markets. Jones et al. (1999) in a comprehensive analysis of share issue
privatisations provide descriptive evidence about the percentage of shares allocated to
foreign investors.  They find foreign allocation of shares in 60 per cent of the 505 initial
offers reported for the 1977-97 period, with an average percentage of stock of 30 per
cent. They use these percentage as an explanatory variable of underpricing, finding little
significance. Although our samples partially overlap, they do not examine the
determinants of the allocation of shares to foreign investors.
In the finance literature, the paper is very closely related to the work of Pagano et
al. (1999) on the determinants of the cross-listing decision by private companies. They
show that the probability of a cross-listing is positively related to the size on the
company, to foreign turnover and high R&D expenditure
2.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 analyses the main issues, surveys the
relevant literature and puts forward some of the hypotheses we have worked on. Section
3 presents the dataset, and illustrates in detail the variables used in our study. Section 4
provides some descriptive statistics and illustrates our main results.
2. The determinants of the decision to cross-list
There are very few established theoretical results that we can use to put forward
hypotheses on this problem.  Notice that our analysis will try and explain both (i) the
decision to list abroad and (ii) the percentage of capital to place in the foreign stock
market. Although these decisions are in principle separate, in abstract terms it is hard to
think of variables likely to affect one side of the story, but not the other. Ex-ante, we
shall not distinguish these two logical steps, and thus the considerations that follow can
be referred generically to the decision to list companies abroad, without further
specifications.
                                                
2 Work by other authors is reviewed in the following section as their results represent the basis for some of
our hypotheses.7
As the decisions to go public by owners of private companies and by Governments
are probably related, it is interesting to start by considering why private companies cross-
list.
A reason why private firms do so is that they may be unhappy with the reputation
of their home stock market and try to borrow the host country’s reputation, as the foreign
market acts as a certification body for the company. In this way, managers of firms with
high expected profitability may credibly convey their private information on future
prospects of the firm by listing on a market where disclosure is higher and investor
protection stricter (Fuerst, 1998, Pagano et al., 1999,  Leuz and Verrecchia, 1999).
In any case, firms are keen to attract foreign capital, but several empirical studies
(e.g., Lewis, 1999) confirm that a strong home country bias exists, so that investors tend
to keep a “larger than optimal” share of their funds in home financial markets. Cross-
listing is therefore a way for companies to diversify the sources of external finance and
reduce the cost of capital.
Empirical evidence suggests that cross-listing of a share can also increase its
liquidity (Karolyi, 1998). Although the concept of liquidity is intrinsically ambiguous
3, it
usually refers to the ability of a trader to sell or buy a stock (i) without delays (ii) at a
price not subject to sudden changes related to orders of normal size and (iii) with low
transaction costs. A more liquid stock is thus less risky as shareholders can sell it or buy
it more promptly, with lower price volatility and/or lower bid-ask spreads.
Liquidity is thus highly desirable, and the fact that cross-listing should decrease the
cost of risk capital is no surprise: an increase in liquidity entails a greater desirability of
the stock from an investor’s viewpoint, so that the return investors require should be
lower. The evidence on the effects of cross-listing surveyed in Karolyi (1998) indicates
that indeed cross-listing could be an effective way to increase the liquidity of the stock,
although factors like market fragmentation could have an offsetting impact (see
Domowitz et al.  (1998)).
Other reasons to list on foreign markets are related to the desire of the firm to
achieve a greater “visibility” to foreign customers (Karolyi, 1998). As Pagano et al.
(1999) suggest, cross-list could be a strategy to capitalise on product market reputation.
Indeed, high foreign sales appear to be increase the probability of cross-listing. Both
private companies and SOEs which are exposed to global competition are maybe8
particularly eager to tap international capital market in order to increase penetration on
foreign markets
4.
2.1 When the Government is the seller
Although there are probably common determinants, we believe that the public v.
private identity of the seller should matter in the decision to cross-list. In a  privatisation
process, a Government also pursues more general objectives that could affect the
structure of the placements and the regional distribution of the offering, such as:
alleviating public finance, redistribute wealth for political reasons, develop securities
markets, increase institutional credibility. These are the factors that we mainly focus on
the present analysis, while – also given the size of our sample – company-specific
information is only marginally considered.
The possible determinants of the decision to cross-list shares of privatised
companies are grouped into several categories: (i) public finance variables; (ii) external
accounts variables; (iii) political variables; (iv) institutional variables; (v) stock markets
development indicators;  (vi) company and transaction characteristics and (vii) control
variables.
(i) As to public finance, we already know that countries which have fiscal problems
tend to privatise more (Bortolotti et al., 1999). Given the decision to privatise, selling a
firm abroad allows one to reach a larger number of potential investors, and thus increases
the expected revenue from the deal, so that countries with problems of public budget
should be more likely to use this channel.
Furthermore, countries which have fiscal problems should also tend to list their
companies in foreign markets to signal to the international community the effort to trim
down the public debt, as a strategy to increase credibility of stabilisation and structural
adjustment policies. Listing on a foreign stock market may have this effect in that the
Government is trying to maximise not only the immediate quantitative result of the
privatisation (namely, its current proceeds), but also the visibility of its effort.
 (ii) The next aspect we want to consider is the country’s openness to trade. Listing
abroad is a way to provide the firm an additional international exposure and to attract
foreign capital so that this decision is naturally linked to a country’s relationship with the
                                                                                                                                       
3 See Baker (1996) for a series of definitions of liquidity and of ways of measuring the liquidity of a market
or of a stock.9
rest of the world economy, which can be specified both as regards the real side and
referring to capital movements. In principle, several factors might thus prove relevant on
this point, such as import, export, trade deficit and capital movements.
As specified in the previous discussion, international trade may be relevant to the
cross-listing for a privately owned company as cross-listing is a way to improve the
firm’s ability to penetrate a foreign market. This seems to suggest that countries which
are relatively open to international trade have little need to use cross-listing, while
relatively closed economies will use it as a way to favour the visibility of their companies
towards foreign consumers. Another element that potentially matters is the level of net
capital inflows, and in principle one should expect countries with low inflows of capital
to sell abroad more in order to attract (scarce) foreign capital.
It seems reasonable to expect that the presence of problems with external accounts
will instead encourage countries to list companies abroad. The existence of large trade
deficits or of a considerable stock of foreign debt implies that attracting foreign capital or
favouring commercial penetration in foreign markets becomes particularly desirable, so
that cross-listing becomes more likely.
(iii) Turning to the political economy of privatisation, it is known that right-wing
Governments tend to privatise more and with the aim to create people capitalism through
large share offerings on public markets and underpricing (Bortolotti et al., 1999, and
Jones et al., 1999). The theoretical backing can be found in the notion of the median
voter. By selling firms in the domestic market, a Government increases the voters’
interest to “free-market oriented” policies and  may shift the median voter’s political
preferences to the right.  A right wing Government can thus strengthen its position by
especially targeting the home market, as indicated for instance by the policy of spreading
share ownership pursued by the conservative British Governments in the Eighties (Biais
and Perotti, 1999).
One would therefore expect that if POs are designed by right wing Governments to
target domestic voters, the right should be more reluctant to allocate shares to investors in
foreign constituencies. The opposite should be true for the left, more interested – given
the decision to privatise – in the maximisation of proceeds.
5
                                                                                                                                       
4 For a theoretical backing of this hypothesis, see Fulghieri (1999), who suggests that the firm’s presence in
the foreign (goods) market improves financial markets information and thus favours cross-listing.
5 One could think that the decision about the regional distribution of the offer is more technical, rather than
political. In fact, in many circumstances once the book is made, if the offer is oversubscribed, the
Government has to decide whether to favour domestic vs. international investors.10
(iv) Institutions define the playground for privatisation and may play a role in the
cross-listing decision. The issue of institutional credibility mainly refers to country risk
and investors protection, a point raised by an increasing empirical and theoretical
literature
6. On the one hand, a country where private investment is not well protected
might tend to resort to cross-listing in order to borrow the reputation of another country;
indeed, listing on a foreign exchange means receiving a form of certification from that
exchange, so that investors know that the firm will be monitored by different markets and
sets of investors
7.
Furthermore, in order to be admitted to listing on an exchange, a firm must comply
to its regulations, in particular in terms of information provided to the public. For
instance, listing in New York implies issuing comprehensive reports every three months,
while other markets allow a much less frequent reporting. When a firm is listed in
different exchanges, it automatically offers domestic investors at least the same
protection offered to foreign shareholders in terms of information disclosure, and so on.
This might imply that countries with little credibility or where small shareholders are less
protected will tend to use cross-listing more extensively
8.
(v) Turning to financial markets issues, a Government – not too differently from
private firms – is interested in the efficiency of its financial market since efficient
markets provide diversification, information aggregation and monitoring (Amihud and
Mendelson, 1991; Holmström and Tirole, 1993). But very differently from private
companies which are typically affected by co-ordination problems, a privatising
Government might be able to effectively manage the externalities stemming from the
listing decision (Pagano, 1993).
In this respect, it has been shown that cross-listing may also determine an
improvement in the efficiency of domestic financial markets. Some empirical evidence
shows that the inception of trading on the London SEAQ International section of Italian
stocks actually increased the trading volume of the Milan stock exchange (Pagano and
Steil, 1996). Similarly, with regards to Belgium, trading in London seems to have
                                                
6 La Porta et al. (1997), (1998).
7 On the relationship between privatisation processes and political risk, see Perotti and Van Oijen (1999).
For the problem of law enforcement, see Modigliani and Perotti (1999).
8 Potentially, there might be a second effect, in that foreign exchanges might be reluctant to accept firms
coming from countries offering a low level of protection to investors. However the latter effect is probably
very weak.11
stimulated greater trading in the home market (Anderson and Tychon, 1993)
9. Cross-
listing could therefore be an important tool in the transitional phase, fostering stock
market development and integration. These arguments suggest therefore that the size of
the stake floated on foreign markets should be negatively related to domestic financial
market development, at least for countries which still need to attract the attention of
foreign investors.
This should be true also because the size and efficiency of financial markets (along
with savings) determines the ability of that market to easily absorb large offerings.
Therefore, if a country has a large stock market its need to go abroad to look for buyers
will be limited.
In principle, we should thus expect countries with small and less liquid stock
markets to resort to cross-listing more than others. Governments in countries with a well
developed exchange do not need to bear the costs use of a global offering, so that we
could expect that liquidity indices or size indices of the stock market to be negatively
related to the phenomenon we analyse. The same might be true for the savings of the
country, in that if a country saves little an initial public offer will probably be harder to
absorb at a reasonable price.
However, one should also consider that even if the firm is listed in different
market, there typically is a “dominant” one, where most of the transactions are carried
out, and which has a dominant effect on price formation. Typically, at least if the home
market is reasonably developed
10, the dominant market tends to be the home one
(Karolyi, 1998), so that the quality of the home market – and in particular its liquidity –
becomes relevant in explaining why foreign investors may be inclined to invest their
money in a  given firm. In other words, firms coming from illiquid markets will be harder
to sell, while firms coming from liquid markets will be more desirable to foreign
investors as well.
                                                
9 Notice however that these analyses compare the situation before cross-listing with the situation after it.
The positive repercussion of cross-listing should thus be interpreted as an improvement relative to the
previous situation. This does not imply, however, that the home market has shown an improvement relative
to what would have happened if all shares had been sold in it. Thus, these empirical findings do not imply
that selling shares in a foreign market is better than selling all shares in the home market; this
counterfactual exercise is indeed extremely difficult and we are not aware of any evidence on this point.
10 If a firm from an emerging market is quoted at NYSE, the latter market is likely to become the dominant
one. Therefore, this effect is likely to be weak for countries with very small markets. Fuerst (1997) also
points out the existence of relevant asymmetries of a similar type.12
The demand from abroad could affect the final allocation of shares as the seller
adjusts it after the book-building
11. Essentially, having a more liquid home market shifts
the international demand for shares of privatised companies to the right. This introduces
an element of potential ambiguity in the sign of the coefficient of financial development
indicators, in that countries with less developed markets might be less able to do cross-
listing exactly because foreign investors might be reluctant to buy the firm.
It can thus be said that there is a tension between the need of a country (the need to
cross-list to exploit what foreign stock markets ban offer) and the opportunities open to it
(cross-listing is feasible only when the home exchange is developed enough to provide a
guarantee to foreign investors). Only the empirical analysis will be able to tell which
effect prevails.
  (vi) Finally, the decision to cross-list should also be influenced by company’s
characteristics. Many stock markets are characterised by stringent requirements for
listing of foreign companies, and sometimes more severe capitalisation requirements are
introduced
12. Furthermore, the “visibility” of a company vis à vis local investors is often
indicated as a factor that reduces the ability of firms to attract foreign capital: small firms
only active in their home country are unlikely to be well known to foreign investors and
to become widely traded abroad. Therefore, a company’s size is the first aspect we can
focus on, and indeed it is sensible to expect that small firms will rarely be listed in
foreign markets, and that size represents a precondition for cross-listing.
The second group of variables are sector dummies, which try to capture specific
sectoral features, and in particular the openness of each sector to international
competition. We expect the greater international exposure of firms operating in global
markets relative to firms operating in “closed”, mainly national markets to make a
difference. For instance, there are sectors such as telecom, where competition is
intrinsically global, and where a global offer might seem quite natural; the contrary might
be true for other public utilities. The reason is that information on firms operating world-
                                                
11 In public offerings, the percentage of stock sold abroad is set after “bookbuilding”. Under this procedure,
the investment banker acting on behalf of the seller solicits bids for shares from investors and then sets the
price, also adjusting the quantity supplied and the distribution of the shares among different classes of
investors when closing the transaction. There have been several cases in which the percentage allocated to
foreign investors increased during the bookbuilding process. For instance in Italy during the sale of the
third tranche of ENI (1997) the initial offer envisaged one third of the shares reserved to international
investors, while the final allocation (including the “green shoe” option) saw that percentage reduced to
27.7%.  A similar story could be referred to the sale of Banca nazionale del lavoro (1998-99), where the
international share fell from an initial 34% - indicated in the offer plan - to a final value of 24.9%.13
wide is likely to spread quite rapidly, while information on local firms remains difficult
to attain for a foreign investor, who will be unlikely to but shares in firms where
information lags may be substantial. Quite different is probably the case of banks, which
are often regarded by Governments as “strategic” assets, especially in bank-oriented
financial systems
13.
(vii) The type and timing of the issue could also be important. A global offering is
certainly a difficult transaction to implement. Government officials are typically assisted
by economic, legal, and financial advisers in slating the enterprise for privatisation,
organising the  road-show, ensuring compliance with cross-border regulations, disclosing
relevant information, etc. In a nutshell, the seller – suitably guided by reliable advisors -
has to learn how to privatise, and the experience accumulated overtime will avoid fiascos
and botched sales. This argument suggests that international offerings should be less
frequent and the stakes placed abroad smaller at the IPO. By the same token,
international offers should be observed more often the more advanced is the privatisation
process.
(viii) As for traditional macroeconomic variables, it seems natural to think that rich
countries are those that are more likely to engage in sophisticated and complex financial
operations, so that – at least as “controls” – some general development indicators should
be considered. The level of savings and unemployment could also be considered.
However, these variables will mainly be used and interpreted as control variables.
3. Data
Our source for data about privatisation transactions is Privatisation International
Database, one of the most comprehensive sources at the company level. This source
reports major deals with a cut-off value in terms of revenue of US$500,000 from 1977 to
date in 113 countries. The sample includes both public offerings (PO), and private sales.
The average private sale is worth US$224.8ml, with a median value of US$50ml. The
average PO is instead worth US$730ml, with a median value of US$135ml. The smallest
                                                                                                                                       
12 As far as the NYSE is concerned, the principal listing standards are the following: 5,000 round-lot
holders world-wide; 2.5 million of public shares world-wide; $100 million of public market value.
13 The notion of “strategic” sector is more common in the political debate than in the academic one. Even
in the political debate there seems to be little agreement on what counts as strategic. Some Governments
seem to include in the definition all utilities, and possibly heavy industry, high-tech sectors or the energy
sector.14
PO of the sample is worth US$1,000,000, which is the double of the cut-off. These
figures suggest that by focusing on major deals we are not losing much information about
privatisations on public equity markets, which are the object of our research.
Privatisation transactions by PO will be the unit of analysis. Our sample covers 392
deals in 42 of the 49 countries identified by La Porta et al. (1998)
14 having at least five
domestic non-financial publicly traded firms with no Government ownership in 1993
15.
This restriction broadly identifies countries with an existing capital market with public
shareholders: this seems appropriate, in that including countries without such feature one
runs the risk of mixing the decision to go abroad with the decision to have a public offer
(without a proper exchange, going abroad may be the only way to run a PO). By the same
token, we exclude transition or socialist economies, which would increase the
heterogeneity of our sample, and which we feel should be object of a separate analysis.
Our sample contains 392 public offers, 185 of which featured a listing of stocks on
foreign capital markets. In major flotations, the issues involved a cross-listing in one or
more foreign market, but there are also eleven cases where the stock was only sold
abroad
16. We will not consider  in the empirical analysis the regional distribution in
various markets nor the various types of securities issued (ADR, GDR, or direct
listings
17). Not surprisingly, in the few cases where comprehensive information about the
regional distribution is available, almost all the offerings  involved an issue on NYSE
and/or LSE.
                                                
14 In our sample we have 22 OECD countries, i.e. Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and United Kingdom, and 20 non-OECD countries, namely Argentina,
Brazil, Colombia, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Israel, Kenya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines,
Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, Venezuela, Zimbabwe.
15 The choice of the year is appropriate to our end since 1993 is the median year of the distribution of
global privatisation proceeds.
16 The main case of this type one is the sale of VSNL – an Indian TLC company – which in 1997 yielded
US$439.22 m.
17 When a company decides to launch a public offer of sale on a large international market, it must prepare
a Depository Receipt (DR) Program. DRs a representative securities held in deposit by the country of the
issuing company. They are traded in the currency of the host country and subject to its rules regarding
clearance, settlement and the transfer of ownership. There are different types of DR entailing different
levels of complexity and discipline. Global Depository Receipts (GDR) are usually traded in major bourses
outside of the U.S. – above all on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) – and over-the-counter or off markets
in the U.S. A company that issues GDRs is not subject to the General Accepted Accounting Principles
(GAAP) nor must it wholly abide by SEC regulations. Companies that intend to offer their shares to
American institutional investors and be quoted stock markets must use American Depository Receipts
(ADR). These entail the same responsibilities as American shares,  ranging from GAAPs to SEC rules on
transparency.15
3.1 The dependent variable
We define our dependent variable (ABROAD) as the ratio - in each privatisation
deal - between privatised equity sold abroad and total equity sold. The variable thus
ranges from zero to one. We include the fraction allocated through private sale to foreign
investors as for instance the sale to “qualified buyers” according to the SEC Rule 144.
ABROAD is constructed for each privatisation transaction, taking therefore
different values for the same firm if it is sold in multiple “tranche”. This variable
displays 183 positive observations in our sample (47%). We have chosen to use the
transaction rather than the firm as observation unit because offers involving multiple
tranche occur over a long period of time and Government preferences and constraints
typically change over time, thus affecting their decisions to cross-list.
To avoid sample selection bias, we bring into the analysis also purely domestic
public offers, namely POs only targeting domestic equity markets. This allows us to
focus on two conceptually different choices, i.e. whether or not to go abroad at all (trying
to explain why a Government sticks to a domestic offering), and how much to sell.
We now describe the variables that we use to test the hypotheses developed in
section 2.
3.2. The independent variables
As stated in the introduction, we believe that to put the Governments’ decision to
cross-list in the right perspective one needs to enlarge the perspective adopted for private
companies. In this direction, it is particularly important to bring into the analysis the state
of the domestic economic, institutional, and political system at the time of the
placements. Company-specific information is certainly valuable, but the overall situation
of the country and of the Government at the time of the sale are probably even more
important, as they determine the objective function and major constraints of the decision
maker.
The possible determinants of the decision to cross-list shares of privatised
companies are grouped into several categories: (i) public finance variables; (ii) external
accounts variables; (iii) political dummies; (iv) institutional variables; (v) financial
markets development indicators and (vi) company and transaction information, and (vii)
control variables. This list includes time-varying variables dated for the year of the
privatisation transaction. The only exceptions are macroeconomic control variables that
have been averaged away for one country privatisation period. The reason for that choice16
is that we are interested in capturing country-specific effects and this can be done by use
of  relatively stable variables like GDP per capita, aggregate savings and growth rates.
We would like to stress that this has meant building a massive database on 42
countries over an interval of 22 years (1977-98), for 29 independent variables referred to
392 operations (a sum total of more than 10.000 data points, some of which are in turn
averages of data of the three years before each PO). Variables and sources are described
in detail in Table 1.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
(i) Public finance variables. We consider two aspects of public finance: fiscal
deficits and foreign debt. We have collected historical data and taken the average over
the three years prior to each PO in our sample. By doing so, we obtain variables which
are not affected by endogeneity problems (a potentially important issue since
privatisation - typically through revenues generation - could have an impact on public
finance). In particular, having a pre-determined variable for foreign debt is crucial since
(i) privatisation revenues are often allocated to a fund for debt reduction; (ii) a well-
designed privatisation package contributes to the reduction of  credit risk with positive
effects on interest payments; (iii) public-sector debt instruments have been used in
privatisation transactions typically in less developed highly indebted economies.
We have defined the variable DEFICIT as the ratio of central Government  deficit
to GDP, while FDEBT is the ratio of public and publicly guaranteed debt held by foreign
investors to income. The only difference is that we scale the stock of foreign debt by use
of GNP (income generated by factors belonging to a country) rather then GDP (income
produced in the country), since we consider particularly important the capacity of
residents to honour the obligations of the country.
  (ii) External accounts variables. The extent of cross-border privatisation deals
could be affected by the degree on “openness” of the economy. It is customary to
measure openness through conventional trade variables such as imports, exports, and the
sum of the two as a percentage of GNP (IMP, EXP, TRADE). These trade variables are
also time-varying, being constructed as averages over the three years prior to each PO.
We complement these “real” side variables with a typical financial variable such as the
ratio of net foreign direct investment on GNP (FDI). This variable is defined as the
average of the balance between inflows and outflows of foreign direct investment for a17
given country over the three years before each PO.  The choice of FDI is due to the fact
that it represents the most relevant and less volatile component of international financial
flows (Lipsey, 1999).
  (iii) Political dummy variables. Privatisation obviously has a political
underpinning, but measuring the “politics” of privatisation is a difficult exercise. Our
objective is to classify the political orientation of the Government which has
implemented each single PO. We have preferred to focus on the Government in place at
the time of the deal rather than the one that started the privatisation, as decisions on
whether and how much to sell abroad are taken just before the deal, and no commitment
by previous Governments seems relevant to the point.
Governments typically change after elections and coalition re-alignment frequently
occur in the course of a country’s privatisation process, so it is fundamental to have a set
of time-varying indicators. In this direction, we have first picked from Wilfried
Derksen’s  Electoral Web Sites four possible categories of political orientation: (i)
democratic conservative (right wing), (ii) left-wing (iii) centrist and Christian-democratic
and (iv) non-democratic.
Democratic conservative parties are defined as parties adhering to traditional values
in combination with free-market ideology and law-and-order positions. Left-wing parties
include labour, socialist, social-democratic, and communist parties. The term “non
democratic” is used when a country is ruled in a dictatorial or authoritarian way; military
regimes are included in this label. The category of “centrist” parties is somehow residual,
and includes coalitions which cannot be clearly labelled in any of the above ways. In
particular, we include here parties which are in the centre of the political spectrum
without officially adhering to free market values, Christian-democratic parties and wide
coalitional Governments without a clearly discernible orientation.
We then retrieved the political history for our countries from Banks et al. Political
Handbook of the World
18, identifying the incumbent Governments at the privatisation
dates and attached to the political coalition supporting the Government one of the above
labels through the dummies RIGHT, LEFT, CENTER, NONDEM.
(iv) The institutional variables that we use in the analysis can be classified into two
groups. The first includes a measure of Government’s credibility in terms of respect to
private investment as reflected in the country rankings in terms risk of expropriation and18
of repudiation of contracts by the Government (CREDIB). Since privatisation has been
shown to be instrumental to reputation building and credibility, we take the ranking of
the country in the year before each PO. According to the International Country Risk
Guide, a country where the risk of contract repudiation by the Government is high may
initiate a contract modification with a foreign business because of an income drop,
budget cutbacks, a change of Government, or a change in the Government’s economic
and social priorities. The risk of expropriation of private foreign investments
encompasses outright confiscation and nationalisation. This variable ranges from 0 to 10.
The second group includes measures for the legal protection of investor. Legal
protection of investor could potentially drive the decision to float the company abroad in
more regulated environment. Legal protection of investors is defined in terms of legal
rules and their enforcement. The “anti-director rights” index (ANTID)
19 measures the
legal protection that a country’s company law affords against the risk of expropriation by
managers.  The variable  takes into account the existence by law of proxy by mail,
cumulative voting for directors, oppressed minority mechanisms, requirements about the
deposit of shares prior to general share holders meeting, minimum percentage of shares
to call for an extraordinary meeting at 10% or below, and the pre-emptive rights that can
be waived only by a shareholder’s vote. This variable ranges from 0 to 6.
The creditors rights index (CREDITOR) conveys information about the bankruptcy
law of a country and accounts for the existence of restrictions such as creditors consent to
file for reorganisation, automatic stay on assets, special rights for secured creditors, and
management stay on the reorganisation process. This variable ranges from 0 to 4.
We are primarily interested in testing the hypothesis that cross-listing shares may
substitute weak legal protection of shareholders, but creditors’ right warrant also
attention. Extensive legal protection of (mainly secured) creditors is typically associated
with large debt markets and powerful banks (La Porta et al., 1997, Demirgüç-Kunt and
Maksimovic, 1996). Poor legal protection of creditors could therefore hinder the
development of domestic bank finance, forcing governments to seek investors of
privatised firms abroad. As suggested by Berglof and Von Thadden (1999), creditors’
                                                                                                                                       
18 This is considered the standard source for this type of information, and has already been used by Alesina
and Roubini (1992).
19 Developed by La Porta et al. (1998), this is a very standard and widely used source for this type of
information, and has already been used for instance by Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Lombardo and
Pagano (1999).19
protection should be particularly important in emerging economies, where stock markets
are small and banks play a major role in project financing.
Finally, the enforcement of law index (ENFORCE) is the average grade obtained
by a country in terms of bureaucratic quality and corruption according to the
International Country Risk Guide. Legal rules and their enforcement determine the level
of deterrence against managerial misconduct. This variable ranges from 0 to 6.
(v) Stock market development indicators. The stage of development of capital
markets should be a critical element in the cross-listing decision by Governments. The
notions of financial development and of liquidity are intrinsically fuzzy, and no obvious
definitions exist
20. We describe the development of a capital market by use of two sets of
variables, one related to market size, and the second to its liquidity.
Size related variables are the number of listed companies (LIST) and the end of
year market capitalisation as a percentage of GDP (CAP). Liquidity variables are the year
volume of trade as a percentage of GDP (FLOAT) and finally the traditional turnover
ratio, the ratio between the year volume of trade and the end of year market capitalisation
(TURNOVER). Once again, to avoid endogeneity problems all variables are dated in the
year before each PO. As sources for these data we have used IFC and FIBV (Federation
Internationale des Bourses de Valeurs) publications, and a few data have been directly
provided by individual exchanges.
(vi) Company and transaction information. The massive size of our sample makes
it very hard to obtain detailed company information, so that we have concentrated our
attention to three aspects only, all covered by the Privatisation International Database.
The first one is firm’s “size” defined as the total market capitalisation of the firm (SIZE),
obtained multiplying the first day quote of the share on the stock market by the total
number of existing shares (including those still held by the seller). Due to endogeneity
problems, this variable will be used only in the descriptive analysis.
  The second one is the sector of activity. We have aggregated the information
provided by our database in a few broad categories using dummy variables. ENERGY
includes firms in the production of oil and gas or in power generation; TLC refers to
telecommunication companies; UTILITY refers to other public utilities working in
sectors with little exposure to competition (e.g., natural monopolies), such as water or
                                                
20 See Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (1996) and Baker (1996).20
public transport and it includes firms involved (also) in gas and electricity distribution;
FIN includes banks, insurance companies and other financial intermediaries.
Finally, we test the “learning” hypothesis by considering two deal-specific
variables: a dummy variable (IPO) which is set equal to 1 in case of an initial public offer
and to 0 otherwise, and the variable TIME, which measures the number of months
elapsed since the first PO reported in the company’s country.
  (vii) Controls will be standard macroeconomic variables. We include in this
grouping the GDP per capita (GDP), as a country average during the whole privatisation
period, namely from the first to the last reported PO in our sample. The variable therefore
takes the same value for each observation in the same country. We use the same
procedure to construct the real growth rates of GDP (GROWTH),  the ratio of gross
domestic savings on GDP (SAVE), and the unemployment ratio (UNEMP). The first two
variables relate to the stage of economic development of the countries, and they are
useful to discriminate the cross-listing behaviour of Governments in more and less
developed economies.
The aggregate savings as a percentage of GDP is also useful to capture country-
specific effects in terms of domestic absorption capacity of large share offers. By the
same token, the unemployment rate is not only a control, but also possibly a critical
factor in the decision to list the company abroad since the discipline coming from foreign
trading may threaten redundant jobs exacerbating unemployment problems.
3.3. Descriptive analysis
Table 2 provides some preliminary data about privatisations in our sample and
some descriptive statistics at the country level. The first column reports the number of
POs, which is a good measure for the extent of one country’s privatisation process. It is
not surprising to find UK leading the ranking by sales, while the second position of
Egypt clearly indicates how the phenomenon is not purely confined to Western
economies. Six countries in our sample have never resorted to global offers, while nine
have always placed their POs in some foreign market.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Looking at country averages, we can see that the share of privatised stock sold in
foreign markets is never purely “ornamental”. Concentrating on international deals, we21
see that when countries decided to sell abroad at all, they sold an average of 42% of the
stock offered, ranging from 13% (Japan) to 100% (Egypt and India).
The comparison between OECD and non-OECD countries is of considerable
interest. OECD countries sell abroad more often (and all countries have done at least one
global offer) but the average percentage of shares offered abroad is higher in non-OECD
countries. This already suggests that the decisions on whether or not to sell in foreign
markets and how much to sell may be quite distinct. Furthermore, in non-OECD
countries, larger companies are more likely to be floated abroad, while the opposite holds
– to a smaller extent – in OECD countries.
Coming to the size of firm sold in the foreign market (see Table 3), we can in
general see that countries sell abroad larger than average firms. Indeed, the aggregate
figure for the whole sample and OECD – indicating the opposite – is mainly driven by
one outlier, i.e. the domestic privatisation deals of NTT – the Japanese
telecommunication company, the fourth largest corporation in the world in terms of
market capitalisation according to FT 500 1996. NTT was sold in three different tranches
for a global amount of US$81bn, a sum entirely raised in the home market. By dropping
NTT, the average firm size for domestic PO is US$2.18bn. With this correction, our
evidence is consistent with Pagano et al. (1999) result, showing that larger companies
cross-list more.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
As for sectors of activity, telecommunications sticks out as the one with the largest
share placed in foreign markets. This is particularly true for non-OECD countries, where
85% of the shares sold are directed abroad (although notice that the average deal involves
only 18.5% of the firm). Non-OECD countries show a particular tendency to sell firms in
the manufacturing and financial sectors mainly in the home market.
Utilities, operating in regulated sectors, are characterised by an interesting pattern,
in that they are sold more often abroad, but the proportion of shares sold abroad is below
average in both sub-samples.
If we classify privatisations according to the political orientation of Governments,
it appears quite clearly that market oriented (right-wing) Governments mainly target
domestic constituencies in the allocation of shares. Indeed, they display the lowest
average percentage of privatised stock floated abroad. Different patterns in the22
international profile of the issues emerge when we split the sample. While in OECD
countries, market oriented Governments are reluctant to choose foreign issues, and stick
to very low stakes sold abroad, in non-OECD countries, they resort to international issues
more often than any other type of Government. We will explore further this asymmetric
behaviour in the empirical analysis.
Finally, it is interesting to see that non-democratic Governments do not display a
remarkably different behaviour from the average democratic regime.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
The preliminary analysis of mean values of independent variables for international
v. domestic issues (see Table 5 for the tests on means) provides further evidence,
showing that international offers are associated to high levels of per-capita GDP and low
levels of growth (which confirms that rich countries are particularly active in this
process). Countries more open to trade (with a high ratio of total foreign trade over GDP)
tend to resort less to global offers. The same is true – somehow surprisingly – for foreign
debt. High deficits appear instead positively correlated to international issues.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
The breakdown between OECD and non-OECD is again very interesting.
Financially distressed non-OECD economies with high levels of foreign debt to GNP
21
and deep fiscal deficits are less likely to float companies abroad.
The role of financial markets variables is particularly intriguing. On aggregate,
stock market size relative to GDP (CAP) seems to matter, in that international offers are
associated with markets with high capitalisation, but this effect is much less clear in the
sub-samples. On the other hand, market liquidity (FLOAT, TURNOVER) does not
characterise in a significant way – in either direction – aggregate figures on domestic and
international offers. However, in this case the aggregate figure seems to conceal opposite
phenomena in the two sub-samples: in OECD countries international offers are
associated with more liquid home markets, while the reverse is true in less developed
                                                
21 However, notice that the data on foreign debt for OECD countries display several missing values, which
undermine any conclusion on this variable for this group of countries.23
economies. We have already stressed the potentially ambiguous role of market liquidity,
but we postpone further comments to the econometric analyses.
Finally, poor shareholder legal protection appears to be associated with a higher
frequency of foreign issues in OECD countries, while creditor legal protection seems
more relevant in non OECD countries.
The descriptive analysis has shown that our variables might have some explanatory
power. Furthermore, these first statistical results suggest that the issue at stake may have
very different explanations in more or less advanced economies, indicating the need for a
thorough econometric analysis of sub-samples.
3.4. Methodology of the econometric analysis
In the empirical analysis, we estimate the factors affecting the probability of selling
abroad at all, i.e. the choice between selling shares abroad when privatising a company or
not, but also the determinants of the size of the stake sold in international markets.
One possibility is to run two separate estimates, a Probit analysis for the first issue
and an OLS regression on positive values of our dependent variable ABROAD; however,
such an estimate would be biased as the dependent variable is limited. Therefore, we opt
for a sample selection model which allows us to jointly estimate both aspects we analyse.
The model we use is a generalised Type II Tobit as in Amemiya (1985, p. 385).
The first equation of the model can be written as:
y1=X1b1+e1
where y1 represents the “utility” of the Government of selling abroad and X1 are the
factors affecting the dependent variable. Given that this utility is unobserved, we define a
new observable variable that equals 1 when the utility of the Government is beyond a
critical threshold y* and therefore the Government decides to sell a certain percentage of
privatised stock abroad, and 0 otherwise:
d1=1 if y1>y*
d1=0 otherwise
The variable d1 is the dependent variable in the equation for the choice to sell
abroad or not and we will refer to this as to the PROBIT or SELECTION equation.24
Whenever the Government decides to sell abroad we observe the percentage of
privatised stock sold on foreign markets. The second equation of the model we want to
estimate is thus:
y2= X2b2+e2 if   d1=1
     not observed if   d1=0
where y2 represents the percentage of privatised stock sold abroad (ABROAD) and X2 the
factors affecting this variable. We refer to this equation as to the REGRESSION
equation. The hypotheses on the error terms are standard, i.e. we assume that they are
jointly normally distributed:
{e1, e2}~N(0,Σ ).
We have therefore a simultaneous analysis of two aspects. The first one (i.e. the
decision to sell abroad) is captured by the Probit analysis, while the second one (the
percentage of privatised stock sold abroad) is carried out thorough a simple regression
equation, but the first part of the model uses the information of the second part to
improve the estimation of the coefficients.
As - so far - our a priori about the determinants of the first and second “step” are
not different, we choose specifications uniquely on the basis of the maximum set of
variables sufficiently uncorrelated with others
22. We therefore run a basic model then
adding variables of interest, and dropping variables from the basic model whenever they
cause collinearity problems.
Before the analysis, we have performed Hausman tests to check for endogeneity of
the explanatory variables, and we have indeed found that firm size (its market value at
the moment of privatisation, SIZE) appears to be endogenous to our dependent variable.
This is not surprising, and simply means that the decision to sell a firm – at least partially
– on foreign markets is not neutral relative to the stock market valuation of the firm,
                                                
22 Multicollinearity is a particularly serious problem in sample selection models. In this direction, we
avoided using two variables in the same regression when their correlation coefficient is greater than 0.5 in
absolute value.25
which is positively affected by this decision. Therefore, we have excluded the variable
SIZE from our regressors.
4. Econometric analysis – the complete sample
This first part of the analysis of descriptive statistics already indicates that (i)
choosing “whether or not” and “how much” to sell abroad seem to be quite different
issues and that (ii) the determinants of the choice could differ in different groups of
countries.
Here we begin an econometric analysis of the data, starting from an overall view –
given by the whole sample considered – followed in the next sections by a more detailed
analysis of the two sub-samples of countries.
Although the tables present all estimates jointly, it seems better to discuss the
results distinguishing between the decision to cross list and the analysis of the size of the
stake sold abroad. Table 6 reports the results of the estimates using all available
observations. Let us start from the first logical stage of the decision process.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
4.1. The decision to cross-list
Some macroeconomic variables display a considerable influence. First, high
income economies are more often involved in foreign issues. Indeed, it is not surprising
that we find more developed economies involved in complex transactions like
privatisations on international equity markets.
Countries with high aggregate savings and greater openness to trade are less likely
to sell privatised companies abroad. It is not too surprising to find also low savings
associated to foreign listing, as the limited domestic saving capacity could force
Governments to look for capital abroad. More interestingly, economies which are close
to international trade seek more often a foreign listing, maybe to increase penetration into
foreign product markets. We also find some – albeit weak – evidence that low ratios of
public deficit to GDP are associated with a higher probability of a foreign listing,
indicating that countries with sound public finance are more credible and therefore tap
more easily foreign investors and markets.26
Our conjecture on the existence of a learning effect so that complex transactions
are postponed to a more advanced stage of the privatisation process is completely
confirmed in our data. International offers seldom occur at the IPO, and their frequency
increases at the end of the process. Indeed, the IPO dummy is highly significant and
negative, while the variable TIME which counts the distance in months from the sale and
a country’s first PO is positive and significant.
The international profile of the share issue privatisations has a neat political
determinant: market oriented Governments not only privatise more,
23 but stick more
often to domestic sales. The coefficient of the political dummy RIGHT is always
negative and highly statistically significant. The idea to earmark shares to national
constituencies to create political support for market oriented platforms has been
purported by Vickers and Yarrow (1988) to explain privatisation in the UK and recently
formalised by  Biais and Perotti (1999). The empirical implication of this model is
confirmed in our  data.
As for sectors, companies in telecommunications are more likely to be sold abroad;
the opposite trend is found for banks and financial institutions, although statistical
significance is limited. The TLC dummy is always statistically significant at the 1%
level. Indeed, the discipline coming from international markets could be particularly
useful for companies which are exposed to global competition like TLC, as long as
having thorough analyst following. The evidence on the dummy grouping banks and
other financial intermediaries (FINANCE) is much weaker, but still suggestive of the
idea that banks on the contrary is a more “domestic” business.
The role of financial market size and liquidity is also noteworthy. It seems that
countries with bigger and more liquid financial markets are more likely to use foreign
listing. The coefficient of market capitalisation is almost significant in the Probit
equation (p-value .14). The ratio of the value of stock market trade on GDP (FLOAT) is
instead positive and highly significant
24. Having a strong home market is probably an
important condition for a successful offering on international markets, as a strong home
market bias exist. Indeed, it will be interesting to whether this result survives in the
                                                
23 Evidence supporting political models of privatisation can be found in Bortolotti et al. (1999), and Jones
et al. (1999).
24 The turnover ratio is slightly less significant. However, given that it behaves in a completely parallel way
to FLOAT, we will not show the results concerning this variable.27
analysis of sub-samples, as “importing” liquidity has been one of the objectives for cross-
listing shares of privatised companies in emerging markets.
Finally, legal rules matter; Governments in countries with weak legal protection of
investors – and consequently – poor corporate governance are more eager to seek a
foreign listing. The coefficients of shareholder and creditors rights (ANTID and
CREDITOR) are always negative and highly significant. As some theoretical results
predict (Fuerst, 1988), cross-listing shares of a privately owned firm could represent a
bonding mechanism to signal the managers’ commitment to maximise shareholder value.
Indeed, our result confirms this theoretical prediction. Governments with weak legal
investors’ protection try to “import” better legislation through cross-listing, “borrowing”
foreign best practices in order to avoid highly discounted fixed price offerings in low
transparency environments.
4.2. The stake sold in non-domestic markets
The previous estimates have allowed us to identify some driving factors in the
decision to cross-list. But once the decision is made, do Governments really want to have
a substantial fraction of stock traded abroad or do they stick to the bare minimum?
Furthermore, which factors explain the variability in stock listed abroad? We exploit our
dataset to set forth some answers to these important questions.
We estimate the size of the stake placed on foreign markets by running the sample
selection model for the 185 positive values of the variable ABROAD. The results are
shown in the regression  equation in Table 6.
One interesting feature of these results is that they are quite different from those
obtained with the Probit estimation. Some determinants of the decision to cross list still
have a similar impact on the size of the stake sold abroad, while others “disappear”. This
is only partially surprising because the decisions on whether or not to cross-list and how
much equity to float abroad are related but different.
Economic development plays the same role: growth rates of GDP are significantly
and negatively related the stake sold abroad, indicating that substantial cross-listing of
shares is typically associated with Governments in developed and mature economies,28
which is also consistent with the statistical description of the data and with the Probit
analysis
25.
Trade flows still have an impact: the variable TRADE is again significantly and
negatively related to the stake sold to foreign investors. Again, TLC companies are not
only more likely to floated on international markets, but also feature substantially higher
stakes sold abroad
26. The political determinant of privatisation is confirmed:
Governments supported by right-wing coalitions appear to be reluctant to float big stakes
abroad. This is in line with the literature on the political economy of privatisation, which
indicates that selling at home serves the purpose of “buying consensus” and the size of
the stake is obviously the crucial aspect. This privatisation strategy allows a Government
to increase the probability of success of market oriented parties at future elections.
Lower percentage of privatised stock are earmarked to international markets and
investors at the IPO stage. This evidence is quite consistent with the learning effect
identified in the Probit analyis. Risk averse Governments stick to domestic sales at the
beginning of the privatisation process and at the IPO, maybe to avoid highly discounted
fixed priced offerings when the company is not know and investor uncertainty high. By
the same token, they reluctantly sell high percentage of stock to international investors,
who are probably less informed than domestic ones.
Finally, the shareholder rights measure (ANTID) is negatively related to the size of
the stake sold abroad: legal protection of domestic minority investors contributes to sell
higher stakes in privatised companies (Bortolotti et al., 1999) but it appears to be crucial
also in the decision on how much to sell abroad.
Several determinants of the decision to sell abroad explain also the percentage of
stock floated abroad but some important variables, such as our stock market development
indicators, apparently play no role in the decision about how much to sell.
The first stage of the decision (sell abroad or not) basically entails a choice of
whether or not to overcome a threshold. In this perspective, the intuition behind some of
the above results can be as follows. A Government does not seem to be able to sell
                                                
25 The reason why here we concentrate on growth rates rather than GDP is purely technical, as we need to
have a different specifications for the two equations to satisfy the order condition.
26 Telecommunications is certainly one of the sectors where privatisation has been more intense world-
wide and has been accompanied by widespread de-regulation, also pushed by various international
organisations. Among regulated sectors, telecommunications are now probably the most exposed to global
competition and this is probably the reason why find frequent share offerings in telecommunications with a
high percentage of privatised of stock floated abroad.29
abroad unless its stock market is sufficiently large and liquid, but after the initial decision
is made, not much is gained by increasing the percentage of capital sold.
A new sector dummy (ENERGY) turns out important when estimating the stake
sold abroad. Governments seem quite wary of floating large fractions of equity in the
energy sector, which is often considered “strategic”.
5. An econometric analysis of sub-samples
The stage of economic development certainly plays a role in the decision to cross
list. Tables 2, 3 and 4 clearly show that different levels of per capita national income and
average growth rates of GDP are associated with different patterns in the international
profile of privatisation issues. Indeed, more developed economies – with high per capita
income and low growth – exhibit an higher frequency of global offerings and higher
stakes sold abroad. In order to better control for the heterogeneity within our sample, we
break it in two sub-samples referring to OECD and non-OECD countries and replicate
the empirical analysis that we carried out in the previous section. As the correlation
between independent variables varies within each sub-sample, it has proven impossible
to stick to common specifications in OECD and non-OECD models. As before we will
start with the econometric analysis of the decision to cross-list via a Probit model and of
the percentage of privatised stock abroad through a sample selection model.
5.1 OECD countries
Here we have 216 observations, with 69 cases of purely domestic offers and 147
cases where we observe a percentage of capital sold abroad.
Table 7 shows the results of our estimates for OECD countries.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
Several stories already illustrated in the global analysis still hold in OECD
countries. Quite interestingly, even within a relatively more homogeneous sample, the
level of economic development is still important in the decision to list privatised
companies abroad and so are the growth rates of GDP. The learning hypothesis is again
confirmed in this sub-sample, as international offers are again increasing overtime.
Indeed, the coefficients of the variable TIME are still positive and highly significant.30
The political orientation of Governments is an important element in privatisation in
OECD countries. The political dummy RIGHT identifying “market oriented”
Governments negatively and significantly affects the likelihood and the size of a global
offering. This evidence confirms the empirical validity of the political theory of
privatisation within a sample of countries with well-functioning democratic institutions.
The role of competition at the global scale is also confirmed, as issues in the
telecommunication sector are very likely to target foreign markets and investors.
Home market bias appears to be particularly strong in OECD countries. Stock
market development - measured by the value of trades on GDP (FLOAT) - positively
influences the probability of a cross-listing. Finally, shareholder protection is again a
critical determinant of the decision to privatise abroad and of the size of the stake to float.
The coefficient of antidirector rights is again negative and even more statistically
significant, indicating the pivotal role played by shareholders in countries where financial
markets are more established. Differently from the analysis of the whole sample, creditor
rights do not influence the probability of an international offer, but are critical in
determining the size of the stake.
However, in OECD countries the decision to cross-list is affected by two factors
that were completely irrelevant in the global analysis: unemployment rates and foreign
direct investments.
High unemployment rates decrease the likelihood that a company is sold abroad
and the stake sold to foreign investors; domestic issues are often earmarked to insiders -
managers and employees - which are maybe more interested in job tenure than
profitability. Foreign investors might instead force the Government to restructure and to
cut redundancies, exacerbating unemployment. It is worth noticing that unemployment is
particularly high in OECD countries. The difficulty of unemployment restructuring
(which often entails layoffs) renders the companies less appealing to international
investors so that Governments are forced to domestic sales.
A high level of foreign direct investment (FDI) increases the probability of a listing
abroad. This result is surprising, as countries boasting substantial capital flows should be
less eager raise finance on foreign capital markets.
Other elements seem to suggest that the two stages of our analysis refer to fairly
distinct decisions. Governments financial constraints – measured by the deficit-to-GDP
before the sale – appear irrelevant in the decision about where to list, but crucial in the
determining the size of the stake to sell abroad. We find high deficits associated with31
higher stakes sold abroad, indicating that Governments with hard budget constraints
resort to international listings as a way to maximise privatisation revenue. Indeed,
sophisticated stock markets abroad – combined with strong markets abroad -  are the
ingradients of a successful floatation in terms of proceeds.
Analysing several variables, we can instead detect a threshold effect, as they matter
in the decision of where to sell, but they appear to be irrelevant when it comes to decide
how much to sell. This is particularly true as regards financial variables. Having a large
and liquid stock market helps to go abroad, in that a “good” home stock market is a pre-
condition for having a success in foreign markets, but does not change the size of the
stake sold abroad. The intuition is that even with cross-listing the home market will
probably remain the dominant one in terms of trading volume, so that listing in foreign
markets is unlikely to be successful if the home market does not provide sufficient
guarantees in terms of efficiency, price stability, etc.
5.2 Non-OECD countries
Here we have 176 public offers, 38 of which displaying cross-listing
27. A striking
result of this part of the analysis is that the decision to list abroad or not and the choice of
the amount of stock to place on foreign markets are completely different issues in
emerging economies. In many cases, the reasons underlying these choices are even
opposite. Furthermore, some factors that were important in the other sub-sample are still
noteworthy, but have a different bearing on the issue at stake. Table 8 presents the
estimation and Table 9 summarises the main results.
[Insert Table 8 about here]
                                                
27 Unfortunately some of the data on financial market size and liquidity for some African countries are still
missing, so that we are unable to use more than 150 of these observations.32
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abroad












Table 9: Qualitative summary of the main results (prevailing signs) – non-
OECD
Let us start with the role of politics. In non-OECD countries right-wing
governments are more likely to cross-list, but less willing to have a large fraction of
equity allocated to foreign investors. The coefficient of the political dummy RIGHT is
positive in the Probit, while negative in the estimates for the percentage of stock,
remaining extremely significant in both cases.
A tentative explanation is that where the market system is not well established, a
market-oriented Government might tend to use foreign listing as a commitment device.
Cross-listing entails enhanced transparency of firm behaviour, which is functional to the
goals of a market oriented administration. When estimating the percentage of stock, the
political dummy RIGHT has negative sign predicted by the theory. Even if right wing
Governments are particularly interested in cross-listing as a commitment device (given
the observed positive coefficient in the Probit analysis), they seem to be reluctant to float
a large fraction of shares on foreign markets given their re-election concerns.
Other asymmetries emerge in the analysis of the dynamic pattern of foreign issues.
The learning hypotheses is confirmed in the Probit analysis, as we find a positive and
statistically significant coefficient for the variable TIME. The frequency of international
offerings increases as a country’s privatisation process advances. The same variable is
instead negatively associated with the stake sold so that the initial issues exhibit larger
percentages of stock abroad. This puzzling result could tentatively be explained in terms
of credibility. At the initial stages of privatisation in emerging countries, Governments
face credibility constraints. In order to signal commitment, they choose to sell big stakes33
to foreign investors. As the process advances, Governments gain credibility overtime,
allowing them to increase the frequency of international sales and to earmark shares to
domestic investors to create political support to privatisation.
To test this conjecture, we can read the coefficients of the variable TIME when we
control for the Government’s ideology and credibility. As Table 8 shows, the signs and
statistically significance of the variable TIME are confirmed.
Creditors’ legal protection also has an opposite effect on the two issues that we
analyse. The coefficient of the variable CREDITOR is stable, negative, and highly
statistically significant in the Probit analysis, but positive when we estimate the positive
values ABROAD. The dual role of creditors rights is particularly difficult to interpret.
However, the first result is of considerable interest, mostly when confronted with the
strong effects of shareholders rights in OECD countries.
In non-OECD countries, shareholders rights are quite irrelevant in the decision to
cross-list. The coefficient of the variable ANTID - albeit negative - are never significant.
These results are consistent with the argument set forth by Berglof and Von Thadden
(1999) that creditors’ protection is particularly important in emerging economies, where
stock markets are small and banks play a major role in project financing. Our result
indicates that this happens to such an extent, as the inability of attracting credit due to
inadequate bankruptcy laws forces Governments to raise capital abroad..
Another major difference between OECD and non-OECD countries stems from the
analysis of the role of financial markets development. Table 8 shows that the stock
market liquidity indicators (FLOAT) is negatively associated with a lower probability of
an international offer. Governments in countries with less liquid capital markets tend to
cross-list privatised firms more frequently
28. This strategy allows them to tap more
developed markets and possibly to “import” some liquidity also on their domestic
markets. This is exactly the opposite of what we observe in OECD countries, where
domestic financial development facilitates the cross-listing of shares since the largest part
of volume is traded at home and an efficient home market provides a useful benchmark
for the pricing abroad (Karolyi, 1998).
The intuition for the result might be that if financial markets are less developed – as
in the majority of non-OECD countries – the domestic stock market is most unlikely to
be the dominant one as most of the trading will take place abroad: the liquidity of the
                                                
28 A completely analogous result would be obtained using the turnover ratio.34
home stock exchange is probably quite irrelevant for the formation of prices. Therefore,
the decisive factor in this respect is that countries with less liquid markets will need
cross-listing more than others, and they will therefore display a greater propensity to
engage in this type of operations.
Another important difference sticks out when evaluating the impact of foreign
direct investment (FDI) in the two sub-samples. A lower level of foreign investments is
associated with a larger percentage of stock placed abroad. Now the interpretation is
straightforward: if capital inflows are scarce, Governments are force to finance
companies abroad. This results is in stark contrast with the analysis in the OECD sub-
sample, where FDI increased the likelihood  of cross-listing.
Finally, foreign debt as a percentage of GDP (FDEBT)
29 warrants attention: A high
foreign debt-to-GNP ratio (FDEBT) decreases the likelihood of an international listing.
A high level of foreign debt could be interpreted as a signal of high level of sovereign
risk. If international investors are fearful of the issuer’s financial distress, Governments
are forced to privatise firms on domestic markets. A similar result emerges when public
deficit is considered instead of foreign debt, but results are much weaker in terms of
statistical significance
30. It is particularly important to test the empirical validity of this
interpretation of the coefficient by controlling for Government’s credibility as a proxy for
country risk. In Table 8, one can see that the coefficients of the FDEBT variable are
stable and significant also when CREDIB is included as regressor.
6. Concluding remarks
A useful way to conclude the paper is first of all to compare the main stories
emerging from our analyses, to stress the role of the variables in the two phases of the
decision process.
Macro variables. Variables indicating a country’s financial solidity play an
ambiguous role. In OECD countries, the conventional wisdom suggesting that
Governments will try to sell abroad more – hoping to get higher revenues – when their
public accounts are troubled is confirmed. On the contrary, in non-OECD countries while
                                                
29 Due to missing data, we are allowed to introduce foreign debt as regressor only in the empirical analysis
of non-OECD countries. To the best of our knowledge, data on foreign debt for several European countries
are not available from any centralised source, and mixing sources proves to be very problematic. All the
data we use come from World Bank World Debt Tables.
30 However, the use of the deficit to GDP ratio renders the interpretation of coefficients difficult due to
multicollinearity.35
public deficit is not a significant variable, the ratio of foreign debt to GNP takes on the
role of signals of the credibility of macro policies, so that high values of this variable are
associated to lesser use of foreign sales.
Institutional variables. Our interpretation of the behaviour of macroeconomic
variables  seems consistent with the fact that institutional credibility is relevant only in
non-OECD countries, while the analysis is not even feasible in OECD countries, where
the variable displays too little variability.
Investors’ protection (the variable ANTID) negatively affects the openness of these
privatisation deals. Governments try to induce investors to buy shares of privatised
companies by importing investors’ protection from abroad. A somehow similar
interpretation can be given to the behaviour of the index of creditors’ protection: given
that creditors are very protected by domestic laws, foreign investors are less keen of
investing in the company, and foreign exposure is limited. While shareholders’ protection
matters more in advanced economies, creditors’ protection matters more in non-OECD
Financial variables. Stock market variables also play very distinct roles of in the
two groups of countries. In OECD countries, the home market is likely to be the
dominant one in terms of trade volume, and its liquidity encourages foreign sales. The
opposite happens in non-OECD countries, where the home market’s lack of liquidity is
irrelevant to investors (most of the trading will take place abroad anyway) but it induces
the Government to resort more aggressively to this strategy.
Sector dummies. Companies operating in telecommunications are always natural
candidates for listing abroad. Other sectors seems to matter only in OECD countries,
while in non-OECD countries the treatment of firms appears to be more homogeneous
Political economy. This analysis provides support to the theoretical results on the
political economy of privatisations: Governments declaring support to market oriented
policies sell fewer shares of privatised companies into foreign markets. However, in non-
OECD countries we have an additional element, that might deserve further theoretical
analysis: market oriented Governments seem to use foreign markets to improve their
commitment to a market oriented policy, and are thus more likely to use them in the
privatisation process.36
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Table 1. Description of the variables
Variable Definition Source
ABROAD Percentage of privatised stock placed on non-
domestic financial markets (flag Rule 144a included. The
variable refers to each single PO.
Privatisation International
GDP Country average of the GDP/population ratio for the
privatisation period (starting from the first PO and the last
PO reported). Gross domestic product is expressed in
constant US dollars 1987. Population is current mid-year





GROWTH Country average growth rates of GDP at constant
prices 1987 for the privatisation period (starting from the
first PO and the last PO reported). The variable is constant




SAVE Country average of the gross domestic savings/GDP
ratio at for the privatisation period (starting from the first PO
and the last PO reported). Gross domestic savings is
domestic product minus total consumption. The variable is




UNEMP Country average of the unemployment rate in the
privatisation period (starting from the first PO and the last
PO reported). The variable is constant across POs in a given
country.
United Nations Statistics




FDI Country average of the FDI/GNP ratio in the three
years before each privatisation. FDI is measured as the
balance of the series “foreign direct investment in country”




TRADE Country average of the (Export + Import)/GNP ratio







FDEBT Country average of the Foreign Debt/GNP ratio in
the three years before each privatisation. Foreign Debt is






DEFICIT Country average of the Deficit as a percentage of





ENERGY Dummy taking the value one when the privatised
company belongs to the following sectors: electricity
(generation), oil and gas production.
Privatisation International
FINANCE Dummy taking the value one when the privatised
company belongs to the following sectors: banking,
financial intermediation, insurance.
Privatisation International
INDUSTRY Dummy taking the value one when the privatised
company belongs to the following sectors:  aerospace,
chemicals, construction, electrical, machinery, metals,
mining, motor vehicles, paper, pharmaceutical, rail
equipment, tobacco.
Privatisation International
TLC Dummy taking the value one when the privatised
company belongs to the telecommunication sector.
Privatisation International
UTILITY Dummy taking the value one when the privatised
company belongs to the following sectors: airline, airport,
electricity distribution, gas distribution, rail services, rail-
track, water and sewerage.
Privatisation International
OTHER Dummy taking the value one when the privatised
company belongs to the following sectors:  holding
company, multiple.
Privatisation International
IPO Dummy taking the value when the PO considered is
an IPO.
Privatisation International
TIME Number of months elapsed from a country’s first
privatisation and the date of PO which is considered.
Privatisation International
CAP Market capitalisation/GDP ratio in the year before
each privatisation. Market capitalisation refers to a country’s
main stock exchange.
IFC Emerging Stock
Markets Factbook 1999, World
Development Indicators,
Federation International des Bourse
des Valeurs (FIBV)
FLOAT Trading value/GDP ratio in the year before each
privatisation. Trading value refers to a country’s main stock
exchange.
IFC Emerging Stock
Markets Factbook 1999, World
Development Indicators,
Federation International des Bourse
des Valeurs (FIBV)
TURNOVER Trading value/market capitalisation ratio in the year IFC  Emerging  Stock40
before each privatisation. Trading value and market
capitalisation refer to a country’s main stock exchange.
Markets Factbook 1999, Federation
International des Bourse des
Valeurs (FIBV)
ANTID The index measures the legal protection that a
country's company law provides against the risk of
expropriation by managers.  The variable  takes into account
the existence by law of (i) proxy voting by mail, (ii)
cumulative voting for directors, (iii) oppressed minority
mechanisms, (iv) requirements about the deposit of shares
prior to general share holders meeting, (v) minimum
percentage of shares to call for an extraordinary meeting at
10% or below, and (vi) the pre-emptive rights that can be
waived only by a shareholder's vote. It ranges from 0 to 6.
La Porta et al. (1998)
CREDITOR This index measures the legal protection that a
country's company law affords to creditors. The variable
takes into account the existence by law of (i) creditors
consent to file for reorganisation, (ii) automatic stay on
assets, (iii) special rights for secured creditors, and (iv)
management stay on the reorganisation process. It ranges
from 0 to 4.
La Porta et al. (1998)
CREDIB Average grades obtained by the country in terms of
risk of contract repudiation and risk of expropriation in the
year before each privatisation.
International Country Risk
Guide
ENFORCE Average grades obtained by the country in terms of
corruption, law and order, and bureaucratic quality in the
year before each privatisation. It ranges from 0 to 6.
International Country Risk
Guide
RIGHT Dummy taking the value 1 when the privatisation
was implemented by a government supported by a
“democratic conservative party”. Democratic conservative
parties are defined as parties adhering to traditional values in
combination with free-market ideology and law-and-order
positions.
Wilfried Derksen’s
Electoral Web Sites, Banks et al.
(1998) Political Handbook of the
World.
LEFT Dummy taking the value 1 when the privatisation
was implemented by a government supported by “left wing
parties”. Left-wing parties include labour, socialist, social-
democratic, and communist parties.
Wilfried Derksen’s
Electoral Web Sites, Banks et al.
(1998) Political Handbook of the
World.
CENTER Dummy taking the value 1 when the privatisation
was implemented by a government supported by “centrist”
parties. This label include parties which are in the centre of
the political spectrum without officially adhering to free
Wilfried Derksen’s
Electoral Web Sites, Banks et al.
(1998) Political Handbook of the
World.41
market values, Christian-democratic parties and wide
coalitional Governments without a clearly discernible
orientation.
NONDEM Dummy taking the value 1 when the privatisation
was implemented by a dictatorial, military, or authoritarian
ruler.
Wilfried Derksen’s
Electoral Web Sites, Banks et al.
(1998) Political Handbook of the
World.42






























Austria 17 11 34.7 50 95.00 245.93
Belgium 1 100 16.6 33 0.00 104.00
Canada 12 50 49.2 29 475.1
7
670.67




Finland 5 40 15.8 90 123.3
3
204.50
France 19 100 31.5 43 0.00 1898.8
4




Greece 3 33 23.5 48 53.80 1280.0
0
Ireland 3 67 34.4 49 142.0
0
333.50
Italy 14 93 28.6 45 53.00 2136.3
1




Netherlands 5 100 31.2 40 0.00 1370.4
0
New Zealand 2 50 33.6 67 18.00 890.00
Norway 6 83 36.5 59 45.00 233.40




Spain 17 100 26.2 33 0.00 1522.9
4
Sweden 7 86 35.5 47 1125.
00
610.88
Turkey 3 67 22.0 97 16.00 196.50








Argentina 6 67 30.4 44 1038.
00
952.25
Brazil 5 60 23.7 76 806.4
5
343.10
Colombia 1 0 99.2 0 500.0
0
0.00
Egypt 43 7 32.6 100 31.47 109.33
India 11 18 24.6 100 342.1
6
403.35
Indonesia 4 100 23.3 73 0.00 871.25
Israel 19 11 22.8 17 124.9
9
174.20
Kenya 5 20 23.4 27 10.15 46.00
Korea 4 0 16.1 0 616.2
5
0.00
Malaysia 8 25 26.1 54 388.1
7
687.50
Nigeria 19 0 42.7 0 1.68 0.00
Pakistan 2 50 30.8 83 82.00 997.00
Peru 3 100 33.9 48 0.00 495.67
Philippines 2 50 10.2 28 80.00 71.00
Singapore 8 0 29.1 0 537.7
5
0.00
South Africa 2 0 83.0 0 650.5
0
0.00
Sri Lanka 3 33 36.6 95 1.00 75.00
Taiwan 18 5 19.2 35 316.6
3
885.00
Thailand 8 87 27.8 24 85.00 117.83
Mexico 2 100 9.4 91 0.00 178.00
Venezuela 1 100 31.2 77 0.00 1026.0
0
Zimbabwe 2 0 47.5 0 30.75 0.00








































































































ENERGY 10 30.00 31 31 637.4 3724.345
07
FIN 38 15.79 30 44 883.3
0
638.12






















































































NON DEM 0 . . . . .
TOTAL 21
6

























Table 5: Mean values of statistical variables and test of means














































































































































































* Statistically significant at the 10% level;
** Statistically significant at the 5% level;
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level.50













CONSTANT 0.32 0.53*** -0.20 0.52*** 0.71** 0.64***
(1.22) (6.79) (-0.62) (6.25) (1.94) (7.39)
PILPRO 0.75E-04*** 0.74E-04*** 0.70E-04***
(6.25) (6.26) (5.99)
GROWTH -0.06** -0.06** -0.07***
(-2.71) (-2.31) (-2.74)
SAVE -0.11*** -0.39E-02 -0.10*** -0.35E-02 -0.08*** -0.79E-03
(-7.34) (-0.69) (-7.13) (-0.59) (-5.82) (-0.15)
FDI 0.74 -0.18 1.51 -0.14 1.50 -0.17
(0.75) (-0.60) (1.61) (-0.47) (1.44) (-0.55)
TRADE -0.91*** -0.17** -1.18*** -0.16* -0.57** -0.13
(-4.01) (-1.97) (-4.32) (-1.70) (-2.36) (-1.56)
DEFICIT -0.03 0.59E-02 -0.03 0.98E-02* -0.04 0.55E-02
(-1.21) (0.96) (-1.11) (1.66) (-1.60) (0.89)
RIGHT -0.27* -0.13*** -0.36** -0.13*** -0.38** -0.11**
(-1.63) (2.98) (-2.14) (-3.22) (-1.94) (-2..35)
TLC 0.67*** 0.14*** 0.72*** 0.14** 0.83*** 0.14***
(2.80) (2.53) (2.91) (2.37) (3.14) (2.61)
FINANCE -0.09 -0.02 -0.08 -0.03 -0.29 -0.04
(-0.44) (-0.39) (-0.40) (-0.56) (-1.37) (-0.73)
ENERGY 0.15 -0.10 0.12 -0.11* 0.28 -0.11*
(0.58) (-1.60) (0.42) (-1.83) (0.95) (-1.80)
UTILITY 0.15 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 0.01 -0.03
(0.67) (-0.50) (-0.16) (-0.80) (0.06) (-0.60)
IPO -0.46*** -0.11*** -0.29* -0.09*** -0.11 -0.09**
(-2.82) (-2.81) (-1.68) (-2.48) (-0.59) (-2.21)
TIME 0.01*** -0.11E-03 0.01*** 0.41E-03









σ 0.26*** 0.24*** 0.24***
(12.01) (11.85) (13.55)
ρ 0.83*** 0.74*** 0.78***
(9.63) (5.51) (8.17)
LogLikelihood -165.65 -144.69 -133.60
Nobs: 382 381 383
NOTE - * Statistically significant at the 10% level; ** Statistically significant at the 5% level; *** Statistically significant at the 1% level.  t-statistics in  brackets; standard errors are
computed using the Newton algorithm (analytic second derivatives)52

















CONSTANT -1.39*** 0.38*** -0.24 0.56*** -1.62*** 0.29*** -0.75 0.64***
(-2.72) (7.82) (-0.66) (13.71) (-3.07) (3.73) (-1.36) (13.18)
PILPRO 0.11E-03*** 0.78E-04*** 0.80E-04*** 0.11E-03***
(4.00) (3.19) (2.52) (3.97)
FDI 16.32** 0.85 4.52 0.72 15.80** 0.93 18.62** 1.10
(2.16) (0.83) (0.72) (0.67) (2.03) (0.90) (2.33) (1.05)
UNEMP -1.34*** -0.14* -1.53*** -0.08 -1.01*** -0.14* -1.27*** -0.12
(-3.65) (-1.71) (-4.36) (-0.99) (-2.52) (-1.79) (-3.52) (-1.53)
DEFICIT -0.61E-03 0.02*** 0.01 0.02***
(-0.01) (0.61E-02) (0.29) (3.25)
RIGHT -0.90*** -0.08** -0.68*** -0.75*** -0.07*
(-3.88) (-2.18) (-3.12) (-3.16) (-1.81)
TLC 0.47 0.44 0.42 0.57
(1.28) (1.36) (1.18) (1.54)
IPO -0.09 -0.06* -0.30 -0.08** -0.08 -0.06* -0.14 -0.08**
(-0.39) (-1.70) (-1.45) (-2.04) (-0.31) (-1.77) (-0.62) (-2.19)











σ 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.20***53
(15.62) (14.55) (13.75) (17.14)
ρ 0.29 -0.30 0.45 0.01
(1.03) (-1.16) (1.50) (0.06)
LogLikeliho
od
-61.45 -87.63 -57.01 -65.45
Nobs: 213 216 213 216
NOTE - * Statistically significant at the 10% level; ** Statistically significant at the 5% level; *** Statistically significant at the 1% level.  t-statistics in  brackets; standard errors are
computed using the Newton algorithm (analytic second derivatives)54




























1.65*** -1.29** 1.43*** -0.57 1.36*** -0.63 1.26*** 1.13* 0.60***
(-3.24) (5.35) (-1.92) (5.95) (-0.91) (5.10) (-0.99) (4.72) (1.91) (3.64)
FDI 0.79 -0.84*** 0.22 -0.83*** 0.2 -0.75**
(0.81) (-2.57) (0.18) (-2.71) (0.40) (-2.02)
FDEBT -1.84*** 0.10 -1.77*** 0.40 -2.11*** 0.30 -1.35*** 0.36





-0.37*** 0.98*** -0.36*** 0.74** -0.43*** 0.76** -0.35***
(3.31) (-3.99) (2.84) (-4.11) (2.22) (-3.05) (2.22) (-2.98)
CREDIB 0.05 -0.06** 0.10 -0.05* 0.11 -0.05 0.13* -0.05*
(0.79) (-2.18) (1.37) (-1.79) (1.56) (-1.58) (1.79) (-1.64)
TLC 1.30**
*
1.14*** 0.89** 1.09*** 0.92***
























0.21*** 0.34*** 0.31*** 0.28***
(5.65) (6.20) (4.48) (5.91) (5.50)
ρ -
0.61***
-0.44 -0.89*** -0.75*** -0.56*
(2.49) (-1.14) (-5.34) (-4.36) (-1.71)
LogLikelihood -64.22 -44.60 -54.90 -52.72 -53.84
Nobs: 170 150 149 148 155
NOTE - * Statistically significant at the 10% level; ** Statistically significant at the 5% level; *** Statistically significant at the 1% level.  t-statistics in  brackets; standard errors are
computed using the Newton algorithm (analytic second derivatives)